Bolivia: Reform and Resistance in the Countryside (1982-2000) by Urioste, Miguel
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 
INSTITUTE OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS No. 23 
Bolivia: Reform and 





REFORM AND RESISTANCE 
IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 
(1982-2000) 
Miguel Urioste 
Institute of Latin American Studies 
31 Tavistock Square London WC1H 9HA 
The Institute of Latin American Studies publishes as Occasional Papers selected 
seminar and conference papers and public lectures delivered at the Institute or by 
scholars associated with the work of the Institute 
A preliminary version of this paper was presented on 19 March 1999 at the 
workshop Reform and Tradition in Bolivia, convened by James Dunkerley, 
Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS), University of London, and Miguel 
Urioste, Visiting Research Fellow at ILAS from 1998-99 and currently director 
of the Fundacion TIERRA, Bolivia. Urioste was also a member of Bolivian 
Congress from 1989-97. 
The author would like to thank Ida Pape, who patiently helped with the 
translation and correction of this paper. 
Occasional Papers, New Series 1992-
ISSN 0953 6825 
© Institute of Latin American Studies 
University of London, 2001 
Bolivia: Reform and Resistance in the Countryside 
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Miguel Urioste Fernandez de Cordova 
This study considers the design of public policies as well as initiatives which, 
emerging from civil society, aim to influence the economic development of the 
country and the distribution of its productive resources. The paper has four parts. 
The first describes the current situation of Bolivia's peasants and indigenous 
peoples. The second is an analysis of the main public policies concerning rural 
development in the last two decades of the twentieth century. The third is a 
summary of the continued extreme rural poverty and the fourth argues that it is 
necessary to change some constraints in structural adjustment policies (SAP) and to 
develop a long-term national strategy for rural development. 
The principal characteristics of the Bolivian countryside 
Democratic rural development 
Rather like the revolutionary Agrarian Reform of 1953, the main transformations 
in the Bolivian countryside from 1982 until 1999 have taken place within a 
participatory democratic framework. These developments have occurred in the 
context of a complex transition from state capitalism to liberal capitalism. 
The democratic process that took place during the past two decades made possible 
a slow change in the nature of the state and the character of social actors. This is 
especially true of the Popular Participation Act, which aimed at institutionalising 
citizens' rights at the local level. In Bolivia institutional stability, respect for the rule of 
law, the discussion of opposing ideas within a democratic setting and the alternating of 
different governments in power were all new phenomena, emerging within a 
framework of relative political peace and social tolerance. Compared to other periods 
in the nation's history, and the current situation in other countries of the region, violent 
confrontation in Bolivia had become an exception, being mostly limited to the forced 
elimination of coca leaf crops. 
Bolivian democracy has, nonetheless, been built in the face of difficulties, though 
based on its own raw materials. The traditionally excluded indigenous majority has 
recently achieved a reform of the Constitution that explicitly recognises the diversity 
of Bolivian society, its heterogeneity and its plural ethnic identity. Nevertheless, the 
persistence of extreme rural poverty, which is a permanent form of violence, is still the 
main threat that conspires against the progress of Bolivian democracy. 
The protagonists of the process — peasants, small farmers and indigenous 
peoples — engaged in extensive debating over the reforms of the 1990s diverged 
widely. On the one hand they expressed a certain degree of democratic 
disenchantment because democracy had not solved their main economic 
problems, but on the other they supported the process because they retained the 
hope that in democracy they could achieve better living conditions and a 
genuinely participatory citizenship. A review of their main demands confirms 
that these are in favour of social inclusion and of the articulation between the rest 
of the society and their own institutions.1 As a result a feeling of democratic 
national identity more significant than at many times in the past in Bolivian rural 
society presently prevails. This is one of the most important contributions of the 
rural social movement, of indigenous people and peasants — of the poorest part 
of the population — to the democratic national process. Furthermore, it should 
be stressed that it occurs in a contradictory and paradoxical fashion within a 
general, but heterodox, neoliberal economic framework. 
The material constraints to rural development 
Apart from traditional social exclusion and other political limitations, serious 
physical constraints have opposed Bolivian rural development. Bolivian 
geographical conditions are among the worst in terms of climatic risks: periodical 
and continued freezing, floods and droughts and the consequent permanent 
deterioration of natural resources. To the latter must be added the huge dispersal of 
the population, isolation from internal and external markets and the lack of basic 
infrastructure such as roads, irrigation systems and electric power. This is one of the 
most important reasons behind the persistence of very poor living conditions as 
well as agricultural yields below the average rate in the region. The productive base 
is greatly deteriorated and does not provide sufficient means to generate a positive 
dynamic for rural production, especially in the Andean and Chaco regions. These 
deteriorated material conditions, moreover, have to be added to the persistence of 
unequal productive social relations — a heritage from colonial rule and also, in 
part, of the republican state — that feed the main causes of rural impoverishment. 
The illusion of the Agrarian Reform 
The combination of severe limitations of the physical and geographical 
constraints, together with the impossibility of rebuilding past forms of 
organisation of work and vertical occupation of the territorial space2 conspire 
against simplistic strategies of rural development. Now, faced with high 
population pressure, the majority of rural producers are obliged to pursue 
strategies based on a very fragile subsistence equilibrium, utilising inadequate 
chemical fertilisers, lack of soil rotation and cropping on very steep land. 
Between 1953 and 1993 the Agrarian Reform established by the Revolution of 
1952 distributed 20 million hectares to 550,000 families of the Andean region, in 
many cases organised in communities and ayllus. Between 1967 and 1993 nearly 
three million hectares were distributed to some 80,000 settler families. Between 
1953 and 1993, but especially from 1971 to 1978, the Bolivian government 
distributed 30 million hectares of publicly-owned land, particularly in the Santa 
Cruz and Beni departments, to a very reduced number of individuals, consolidating 
the process of neolatifundismo.3 Thus, the best land and biggest spreads are now 
concentrated in the eastern regions of the country, where the expansion of modern 
agriculture is taking place in the hands of a capitalist farming elite (Mennonites and 
1 Taller de Iniciativas en Estudios Rurales y Reforma Agraria (1997), Fundacion TIERRA, Informe 
de Actividades (La Paz), mimeo. 
2 Murra (1972). 
3 Munoz and Lavadenz (1997), Urioste (1988). 
Japanese colonisers and Brazilian investors). In 1996, after a decade of social 
mobilisation, almost three million hectares were ceded to the native peoples in the 
east of the country as indigenous territories, recognised as Tierras Comunitarias de 
Origen (TCOs — Original Community Lands) by the reformed constitution. 
The main objective of the Agrarian Reform of 1953 was to promote capitalist 
development in the countryside. To achieve this purpose it eliminated the semi-
feudal system of the haciendas and distributed lands to thousands of peasants as 
well as to new large landholders in the lowlands of the eastern region. After four 
decades of sterile effort to subsist on agricultural activity, many families are 
confronting huge difficulties in improving their living standards and are emigrating 
to the main cities or to the regions with larger productive capacities, particularly to 
the department of Santa Cruz, the tropical area of Cochabamba and the north of La 
Paz. The landholdings in their original communities are now extremely fragmented 
and the soil is exhausted because of intensive use and erosion. 
For the majority of the indigenous people and peasants, the 1953 Agrarian 
Reform meant the conquest of freedom from the hacendados, access to land and 
a great promise of wealth, although this was short-lived. The initial process of the 
1952 Revolution led by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) 
was one of social participation for transformation and change, the occupation of 
haciendas, direct distribution of land and the constitution of new communities. 
This process was often misused and abused and it was frequently relegated to a 
second level of priorities by the leaders of the political revolution.4 The strategy 
of the MNR government (1952-64) placed agricultural matters and the 
productive side of the peasant economy at the margins.5 The main attention at 
that time was focused on the monetary stabilisation programme and on the 
generation of hard currency by means of increasing the export of minerals 
through the public mining enterprise, COMIBOL. Mining-oriented policies were 
not only an economic issue but also a social and political target. A very 
important percentage of the mining revenues has been invested in the 'marcha al 
Oriente' (march to the eastern lowlands) together in a complex process of 
peasant colonisation and entrepreneurial investment. 
After more than 40 years of agrarian reform, the initial impulse of this process 
has now conclusively ceased to be a cohesive social dynamic. Among the peasants 
and the indigenous population there is no central idea around which to organise and 
mobilise, as there was with the fight for the land in the 1950s. Rural socioeconomic 
differences are now much more expansive and complex. Today there are many 
more social and economic actors that obey different kinds of rationality, in many 
cases in contradictory ways. 
Not all of them can, nor should, be farmers 
If the living conditions in the countryside were more attractive, the process of 
rural emigration towards the cities would be slower. In other developed societies 
such a process took place alongside industrialisation and the development of 
urban services. In many instances agricultural yields were also in constant 
4 Victor Paz Estenssoro (1996), personal communication. 
5 Dunkerley (1984). 
increase. This, though, was not the case in many Latin American countries and 
especially in contemporary Bolivia. It is certainly not good business to be a small 
farmer with little land in the context of the severe macroeconomic adjustment 
policies and trade liberalisation that Bolivia has experienced since 1985. 
Only a minority of peasants wish to continue fanning in the future, but they do not 
renounce their Aymara, Quechua or Guararn identity. The change of ethnic identity 
accelerates when peasants emigrate to the cities, where they interact with people of 
different ethnic origin and culture. That process is an integral part of entering the 
informal economy and labour relationship of the urban sphere.6 
However, there is not sufficient employment in the cities. Because peasant 
production continues to be in a wave of recession, registering significant decreases of 
productive yields, the main causes of extreme rural poverty are still present. Currently, 
for a very important part of the peasant population, the only real alternative is to 
abandon the countryside. 
In recent years peasant and indigenous families have been very inventive in 
complementing their incomes with non-agricultural activities. In the highlands and 
valleys there are only a few peasants who depend on full-time agriculture for a living. 
This is a very important indicator of the deterioration not only of their conditions of 
life but also of the impossibility for them to establish sustainable and productive 
familial or communal units.7 
In the majority of the communities exclusive dependence on agricultural and 
seasonal crops on tiny plots of land, and a few head of cattle, is so risky that almost all 
the indigenous populations have developed diverse familiar forms of non-agricultural 
work. The question today is whether it will prove at all possible to rebuild sustainable 
and productive units in those communities and farms. This question has to be 
considered for each particular case, but always taking into account that the experience 
of the last three decades has shown that the peasant emigrants and those who have 
acquired some different labour experience constitute the best qualified and the most 
innovative labour force of the family. In a very large number of traditional 
communities only the old people and the children remain, as part of a temporary 
strategy to take care of the cattle and especially of their main asset: the scarce land.8 
In my view, this is an irreversible process of rural decapitalisation and transfer of 
resources from rural to urban areas. The abandonment of the land is taking place at a 
very fast pace in the poorest rural municipalities of the country. Many of the 
traditional areas of the countryside in the Andean altiplano and valleys cannot support 
the reproduction of the entire family on the basis of traditional agricultural activities. 
However, there exist no specific studies as to how to prevent the effects of the 
emigration process in future prospective regional scenarios, nor are there any public 
policies addressing this critical topic to be found. 
To insist blindly on micro-regional development programmes, NGO experiments 
or projects of international development aid, on the often implicit understanding 
6 Although social change has brought about modifications, the reality of being a peasant in Bolivia 
is still closely tied to the notion of being indigenous. This can be seen in the very close relationship 
that peasants all over Bolivia still have with their land, in spite of other cultural or economic 
differences. In this paper I use the terms indigenous and peasant interchangeably. 
7 Urioste (1989). 
8 Ibid. 
that all peasants have to be agricultural farmers always, and that all of them have 
to live in traditional communities for the rest of their lives, makes little or no 
sense. It is more realistic to recognise that a great many present-day farmers, 
peasants or indigenous and small producers, will not continue living as farmers in 
the near future. This, though, does not mean that the process of emigration into 
the insecurity and informality of urban poverty has to be encouraged. 
The strategies of micro-regional or rural municipal development must 
incorporate non-agricultural targets to the same or even greater degree as they do 
agricultural objectives. Promoting rural employment in activities such as micro-
industry and services should be a basic task of the municipalities' annual 
planning process. It is my personal experience, both in and out of ministerial 
office, that when such opportunities are available and have originated from 
legitimate local power, as was the case at the start of the popular participation 
process, indigenous people are by no means opposed to change. 
Table 1: Rates of Demographic Growth according to Space-Contexts and 
Regions (1976/1992) 




Altiplano Valles Llanos TOTAL 
(Highlands) (Valleys) (Lowlands) 
CUM 3.83 4.69 6.81 4.79 
CUS 2.42 9.93 9.12 6.26 
REST 0.39 0.86 3.07 1.06 
URBAN -0.85 0.65 0.77 0.25 
RURAL 1.65 1.95 4.04 2.30 
Source: Desarrollo Humano en Bolivia (Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el 
Desarrollo — PNUD, 1998). 
CUM: Centros Urbanos Mayores (Major Urban Centres) 
CUS. : Centros Urbanos Secundarios (Secondary Urban Centres) 
Ethnic identity continues to be a cohesive element in the rural area 
During the 1990s an explicit demand for the recognition of ethnic identity on behalf of 
the indigenous population took place not only in the Andean region of Quechua and 
Aymara populations but was particularly strong in areas of the lowlands. The 500th 
anniversary of the Spanish conquest of America provided fertile soil for the 
reproduction of some of the cultural roots of re-Indianisation in order to strengthen 
their identity. Those claims are multiple and obey highly diverse rules of logic. 
Following the 1952 Revolution, a homogenising idea which promoted an 
important process of ethnic-cultural mixing or mestizaje of Bolivian society was 
actively promoted. Together with the distribution of land to the indigenous peoples 
and the establishment of a compulsory monolingual educational system in Spanish, 
the revolution forged the image of one common national identity for Indians and 
non-Indians. Nevertheless, monolinguism in indigenous languages still coincides 
with the worst indicators of poverty. Almost half a century later, Bolivia is still 
confronting a harsh reality: the ethnicity of extreme rural and urban poverty. In 
Bolivia, the poorest people are not the white people or the mestizos, but mainly the 
indigenous peoples. For some white and mestizo populations, to be Indian is 
synonymous with being poor, rural and anti-market.9 Although the national 
revolution of 1952 was a purposefully integrative process, it did not succeed in 
eliminating existing social relations of exclusion and ethnic segregation. Colonial 
and republican segregation still persist in a nation where the indigenous population 
is the majority: 65-70 per cent of the Bolivian population is of indigenous origin, of 
which only 40 per cent remain living in rural areas.10 
In the majority of the cases, this strong inheritance of ethnic identity is now being 
modified as mestizacion — or acculturation — takes place in connection with emigration 
to the cities. However, this dilution is not necessarily definitive, since it depends on the 
degree of insertion into the labour market and manifests itself very variably in response to 
the concrete circumstances of each person, family or community. The combination of 
urban and traditional rural/indigenous cultural forms is now a general trend. 
On the other hand, those who decide to remain in the community, or who 
have no other option than to continue as subsistence farmers, look to reinforce 
their indigenous identity in their way of dressing, rituals and celebrations, and in 
their relationship with nature. Another retentive mechanism is the practising of 
forms of social organisation and work that uphold values of solidarity. 
Nevertheless, these values correspond closely to certain levels of homogeneity in 
their living conditions and their access to natural resources. Otherwise, when 
economic differences between the members of a community have become 
significant and some families have overcome the economic constraints of 
subsistence, those forms of reciprocity tend to disappear.11 
As a great majority of small farmers are of indigenous origin, many have found 
the strengthening of their ethnic identity a useful tool to increase social cohesion 
and their capacity to negotiate with both the rest of society and the state.12 But they 
are also ready to revise or abandon such a form of identity, if they are thereby able 
to go beyond existing fragile forms of subsistence and achieve more secure 
employment or a stable income. 
The experience of the indigenous population of the lowlands in the last 
decade is very revealing. It is only with very strong and combative 
demonstrations and marches, asserting their indigenous condition, with their own 
identity, culture, language and their own voice, that they have obtained the 
recognition of Bolivian society and the state for property rights to their 
9 Larson and Harris (1995). 
10 Institute Nacional de Estadistica — INE (1998). 
11 Urioste (1992). 
12 Larson and Harris (1995). 
territories, under the concept of Original Community Lands. In an approach 
which is notably different to that of most Andean claims, the indigenous people 
of the lowlands demanded their territories as communal property within an 
inclusive national framework. 
The recognition of the right to indigenous identity is still an unsettled issue. On the 
one hand, there is an acknowledged danger of national disintegration if ethnic and 
cultural differences are continually exacerbated. Yet the recognition of ethnic and 
cultural differences is a prerequisite to the proposal of any strategy for rural 
development in Bolivia. The Educational Reform is seeking a solution to this problem 
in a most timid way, promoting bilingual and intercultural education only for rural and 
indigenous children at school, and not at all for the white or mestizo populations living 
in the cities. Hence, the cultural gap will continue. 
Coca leaf cultivation damages rural development 
Coca leaf production increased until the mid-1990s in response to the 
predominantly foreign consumption of cocaine. The price of the coca leaf 
fluctuates not only according to ordinary economic variables but also according 
to the degree of violence that is used to suppress its cultivation. The yields of this 
crop — in economic terms — are larger than for any other agricultural product in 
the Andean region.13 The vast majority of peasant coca leaf producers own the 
land that they work, but most of them do not have property right titles that have 
been officially issued and registered. They employ temporary labour, which 
comes from the poorest rural regions of the country, particularly the southern 
highlands. In one or two months of temporary work in coca production these 
workers can generate more income than in a whole agricultural year in their 
communities of origin or in urban employment. 
The public policies aimed at eradicating the surplus of coca leaf promoted during 
the last ten years, but especially since 1998, have diminished the extent of coca 
cultivation substantially but in an environment of sporadic, violent confrontation 
between the state and the peasants. The Banzer-Quiroga government committed itself 
early on to the elimination of the entire surplus coca crop not used in a traditional way 
(for chewing) — more or less some 37,000 hectares — by the year 2002. 
It is difficult to establish precisely the quantity of coca leaf production. It is, 
however, clear that the economic circuit promoted as a result of cultivation, drug 
transformation and further commercialisation, reaches every corner of Bolivian 
economy. Over the last two decades, the activity linked with this crop has 
certainly produced a very important additional source of income, not only for the 
direct coca leaf producers, but also for those who do not live in the tropical 
region of Cochabamba. 
Their direct or indirect surplus moves out of that region in the form of 
household incomes and as part of the complex survival strategy in which 
thousands of poor peasants of the Andean rural areas have become trapped. 
Many of the coca leaf croppers, who live in this area, are relatives or neighbours 
of the temporary workers that they employ, the latter coming from the 
communities from which the former originally emigrated. These social networks 
13 Godoy and de Franco (1992). 
also usually include the family members in the cities, so that when the coca leaf 
surplus is eliminated, it will not only be the direct source of employment of the 
coca producers that is eliminated; a principal source of income for thousands of 
subsistence farmers, especially the temporary coca workers who collect and 
stamp the coca, will also be removed. 
Although coca constitutes an important source of revenue for the rural poor, it is also 
a decisive factor in the disruption of agricultural peasant production. Those peasants 
who, before the expansion of the coca crop at the end of the 1970s, were dedicated to 
agricultural tasks in their traditional communities did not have to confront extended and 
deregulated markets of freely imported agricultural commodities, as has been the case 
since 1985. Before 1985 peasant production was a major portion of the agricultural 
GDP, and their products were sold in the national urban markets.14 At the end of the 
century the cultivation and commerce of this sector has much reduced because their 
products cannot compete in price and quality with imported commodities or those (rice, 
com, wheat) produced by commercial outlets. These peasants — dislocated from their 
original activities by the open market system — have found in the coca leaf circuit an 
economic refuge. As a result, some of the international development agencies — 
especially the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and some specialised 
agencies of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) — have become 
primarily oriented towards coca leaf substitution programmes or alternative development 
projects, most of which are restricted to the Cochabamba tropic area. Instead of investing 
in the poorest rural communities that expel fanners, almost all USAID resources are 
concentrated in the tropical area of Chapare, which attracts new peasants and coca 
workers. A shift in the destination of these resources towards the poorest rural 
communities of the highlands and valleys is required. 
Most of the alternative development programmes in Chapare fail because of their 
inability to find foreign markets in competitive conditions of price and quality. The 
settlers, especially those dedicated to coca leaf production, have built up strong 
organisational networks with high levels of representation and interaction with the 
government officials. This presents yet another difficulty when attempting to eradicate 
coca production without their agreement and compliance. 
The new national axis: the eastern lowlands 
During the nineteenth century, Bolivian agricultural activity was structured around the 
national economy, which at that time was organised around silver mining and the 
urban centres of Sucre and Potosf. The passage to the twentieth century was framed by 
tin production, concentrated in the mines of Llallagua, Uncia and Catavi and the 
economic activity of the city of La Paz. The twenty-first century opens with the 
national economy focused towards agricultural trade, gas exports to Brazil, river 
navigation to the Atlantic, new corridor roads being built to the Brazilian and 
Argentine borders and the iron of Mutun in the Santa Cruz region. In previous 
centuries, rural society and peasant agricultural activity was adapted to mining work, 
cheap labour and food production, with corresponding migratory and trade circuits. At 
present a sustained process in which the smallholders of the Andean region are 
14 Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agricolas — IICA (1998). 
abandoning the highlands and moving towards the eastern lowlands and especially 
the city of Santa Cruz continues to exist. 
Over the last three decades, but especially in the 1990s, the lowlands of Bolivia 
have become very attractive to the peasants and indigenous people from the highlands. 
The mineral resources of western Bolivia are exhausted, international prices of 
minerals have been in constant and deep decline and the public mining enterprise 
(COMIBOL) has been closed down. The economic activity of the Andean 
departments of Oruro, Chuquisaca, Potosi and Tarija has been in severe retreat for 
almost two decades. The deterioration of the productive basis of the majority of the 
Andean communities, in tandem with free agricultural import trade, have converted 
the Santa Cruz region, and especially the city of Santa Cruz, into the principal pole of 
attraction not only for peasant immigrants, but for the entire Bolivian population. 
Little by little, Aymaras and Quechuas have integrated into the regional economic 
circuit in multiple activities in the informal urban economy. They work as construction 
workers, temporary labourers, gardeners or in street trade. 
Other immigrants try to work the land, in some cases with legal property 
rights, in others as tenants, occasionally as squatters. They claim legal property 
rights and often become involved in conflicts with other claimants to land, 
generally big landholders. The evictions of small farmers of indigenous origin 
are frequently supported by armed police action, in direct contravention of the 
Land Law of 1996, by which only the National Institute of Agrarian Reform 
(INRA) is authorised to deal with land property issues. 
Temporary workers, especially those of Quechua origin, who come from the 
valleys to work in cotton-picking and the cutting of sugar cane, have been doing 
so, but without their families, for the past 30 years. More recently they have been 
exploring the possibilities for long-term settlement. Others become 'permanent 
temporary' labourers, constantly shifting from one temporary job to another, 
mainly in rural activities. In theory they are protected by the Labour Act, but in 
reality they do not have any social rights. 
The very rapid expansion of the modern agricultural frontier in the eastern 
lowlands in the last decade is the most remarkable outcome of the structural 
adjustment policies, but not in the sense that this programme is a neutral one. On 
the contrary, advantages in tax structure and foreign trade opportunities, and 
especially very impressive public investments in basic and productive infrastructure 
such as roads, have disproportionately benefited the modern agricultural 
entrepreneurial sectors of the lowlands. Nevertheless, this expansion is highly 
dependent on international fluctuations of raw material and commodity prices, 
especially soya, as well as relying on preferential access to the protected markets of 
the Andean Community. It is still too early to predict if any Bolivian entry into 
MERCOSUR would increase the modern agriculture in eastern Bolivia. The 1999 
devaluation of the currency in Brazil damaged the efforts of the modern agricultural 
sector, and at the time of writing this paper the Camara Agropecuaria del Oriente is 
demanding an extra US$150 million in support from the government, having 
already obtained de facto abolition of the land tax, against the dispositions of the 
INRA Act and the postponing of commercial debt. 
Just as in the past Andean mining followed the expansion periods of silver and tin, 
modem agriculture of the lowlands is now responding to incentives and contractions 
of demand from the international commodity market. The capacity of Bolivian 
producers to influence international trade prices is, of course, practically non-existent, 
whether, as in the 1960s, it was sugar cane, or, as in the 1970s, it was cotton, or, since 
the late 1980s, it has been soya bean and other oil seeds. Meat production has 
developed on a slow but sustained basis mostly in relation to national urban markets, 
but it remains very underdeveloped and there have been only very selective 
improvements in the genetic composition of the cattle herd. 
Bolivian agriculture expanded by half a million hectares over the 1990s on the basis 
of one single crop, the soya bean. In relative terms, the eastern lowlands now constitutes 
the region with the fastest agricultural growth of Latin America.15 However, the financial 
crisis of February 1999 in Brazil and its immediate impact on the economy of Santa Cruz 
demonstrated the extreme vulnerability of this export trade model of the modem 
agricultural sector of the Bolivian economy based on monoculture. 
Table 2: Soya-Bean Crop Cultivation 
Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture Agriculture 
Production Surface Production Surface 




392,523 192,662 940,820 519,454 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica — INE (1998). 
The export-oriented programmes for sugar cane and cotton, and especially for soya-
bean, have increasingly relied on labour-saving modem technology and so have done 
little to overcome rural poverty or to reduce the gap between the modem and the 
traditional sectors of Bolivia's agricultural economy. The expansion of soya 
production has undoubtedly generated important foreign revenue and changed the 
structure of Bolivian exports in a dramatic way over the last decade, but it has not 
been beneficial on the whole. Until the Brazilian crisis, the GDP of the Santa Cruz 
lowlands was growing by approximately ten per cent per annum — almost exclusively 
limited to providers of agricultural inputs and services and showing no sustained 
trickle-down effect. On the contrary, the gap between poor immigrants and big 
landowners is increasing constantly. 
The pressure for land in Santa Cruz has grown constantly in this context of 
expansion of export crops, accompanied by growing foreign investment, especially in 
terms of Brazilian individuals buying land. The price of land is continuously 
increasing, the process of re-titling plots, as part of the recently approved INRA Act, 
shows a clear excess in demand. 
15 Asociacion Nacional de Productores de Oleaginosas — ANAPO (1998). 
1990-91 1996-99 
Table 3: Bolivian Exports (millions US dollars) 




100.6 116.4 453.8 789.3 547.0 
Non-traditional 
(agriculture) 
4.0 7.4 61.7 72.8 284.1 
Source: United States Agency for International Development —USAID (1992)/ Banco 
Central de Bolivia —BCB (1997). 
Two years after the introduction of the INRA Act, not even one hectare of land 
has been expropriated to public property. The process of settling lands with new 
colonisers on publicly owned land was suspended in 1992. In the countryside 
there are more than 14.5 million hectares classified as protected areas under the 
administration of the central government.16 Some of those lands have been 
occupied illegally by squatters, showing a clear need for new colonisation 
programmes, not in these same protected areas, but rather in areas that should, 
according to the new INRA legislation, be expropriated from those landholders 
who simply speculate in real estate and do not put the land into productive use. 
Rural organisations 
Since its foundation in 1979 the Confederation Sindical Unica de Trabajadores 
Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) has been the main community organisation and 
trade union of the peasantry. It plays a central role in representing almost all the 
small fanners, of peasant and indigenous origin, with regard to central and local 
government and the public institutions of the rural sector. This organisation was 
bom out of a response to the clientelist control of the military that became 
established during the era of dictatorships. It has always been the object of 
overtures from the political parties, which seek to extend their influence over the 
rural area. The leadership of the CSUTCB is firmly opposed to neoliberal policies, 
but their political claims have become entangled in a complex process of 
coordination with state policies without changing the structural adjustment policies 
introduced from 1985. Most of the CSUTCBs political energies are oriented 
towards issues related to coca leaf production and distribution. As a result, central 
demands such as citizenship, political power, access to new land, credit and 
significant public investment for rural development have been sidelined, with the 
consequence that the union's national authority and legitimacy decreased 
throughout the 1990s. Many leaders lost contact with their rural origins and the 
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physical act of fanning. Increasingly ideologically-oriented, the CSUTCB has tried 
to convert itself into an Indian political party with aspirations to reconstitute an 
Aymara and Quechua polity and people. 
The Central de Indfgenas del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB), an eastern indigenous 
umbrella organisation, is based on economic class, not indigenous identity. As a result 
of its demands and social mobilisation the entitlement to almost three million hectares 
of the TCOs of the eastern lowlands was obtained in 1996. The participation of 
political parties in CIDOB is less important than in other indigenous organisations due 
to its preferred focus on cultural and environmental topics. They had a poor first 
performance in the last national elections in 1997. 
The Confederation Sindical de Colonizadores de Bolivia (CSCB) is an important 
force in the northern part of La Paz department, Santa Cruz and the tropical zone of 
Cochabamba, having concentrated its activities on coca leaf cultivation. Coca 
producers have secured political control in a number of municipalities of the tropical 
region, as well as the election of four national members of Congress. They have a 
strong political influence and real leadership in the Bolivian peasant movement. 
The Camara Agropecuaria del Oriente (CAO) is a dynamic body representing 
the great majority of modern agriculture entrepreneurs in the department of Santa 
Cruz. It provides a variety of technical and financial services to its associates, 
who include both large and small landowners, the latter mainly of Creole origin. 
In 1998 a successful attempt was made to extend its representation to other 
sectors, such as agribusiness, agro-industry and service providers related to the 
sector. The CAO has important financial and political links, often exercising 
control over the ministry. Due to its corporate access to decision-making centres, 
the CAO was highly influential in negotiating its demands when the INRA Act 
was passed in 1996. The de facto abolition of the land tax it obtained in 1999 
effectively annulled the capacity of the Act to prevent the establishment of new 
neolatifundia. Without a real land tax the Act lacks mechanisms with which to 
improve the productive use of idle land. 
NGOs: volunteers or professionals? 
The most important Bolivian NGOs emerged in the mid-1970s and were originally 
inspired by Paulo Freire's ideas on popular education. Some of the bodies which have 
been working in the rural area since then have become very experienced institutions. 
Others are new and lack coherent orientation. In some cases they promote 
programmes between several NGOs according to traditional networks based on 
gender or microcredit, but the majority of them do not work in the poorest regions of 
the country. Since 1994 NGOs have been obliged to consult with the municipalities in 
order to be included in their annual operative plans, although a specific NGO law has 
been discussed since 1989 without much consensus or any resulting legislation. On the 
other hand, a number of important ideas and experiences developed by these 
organisations have been adopted as public policy, including rural credit, micro-
irrigation, intercultural and bilingual education programmes, the promotion of 
productive organisation and even central aspects of popular participation. 
Local NGOs are mostly financed by private foreign resources, with US$100 
million a year expended among nearly 800 local institutions in the 1990s. A little more 
than half of the NGOs work in rural areas, employing thousands of middle class 
professionals and technicians. Over the recent period, these organisations have often 
been acting in lieu of public institutions and they have traditionally been the only 
institutions working to ameliorate the living conditions of the rural poor. The work of 
NGOs could certainly be of a better quality with a higher degree of professionalism, 
thematic specialisation and more respect for the autonomy of indigenous and peasant 
organisations. NGOs are new social actors with a new challenge in the democratic 
arena they have helped to build. 
Public policy 
Since 1985, a number of measures have been adopted to control hyperinflation in line 
with structural adjustment (SA) and the New Economic Policy (NEP). Some were 
merely formal declarations of good intentions, but the SA-NEP was notably successful 
in stabilising the economy. Some of those public policies, for example those oriented 
to the promotion of agricultural exports of non-traditional crops, were rather 
heterodox and in those cases growth targets have generally been met. 
Elimination of policies controlling internal prices of agricultural products 
In May 1984, a year before structural adjustment, the first democratic 
government after a long period of dictatorship (Unidad Democratica y Popular 
— UDP, 1982-85) implemented the liberalisation of internal prices of 
agricultural production. Until then, public policy had established maximum 
prices for agricultural products in order to protect urban consumers, thus shifting 
the weight of economic crisis to the rural area. The price liberalisation of peasant 
production probably accelerated the hyperinflation process that took place that 
year because peasants could now freely increase the prices of their products. 
The liberalisation of trade 
In 1985, the new Paz Estenssoro government decided to eliminate all constraints 
on foreign trade. From the beginning this decision had the effect of generating a 
surplus which saturated the internal market with imported foodstuffs. Thereafter, 
peasant agricultural production stagnated or declined. Comparing the economic 
behaviour of peasant or traditional agriculture to entrepreneurial or modern 
agriculture it is remarkable how, before the mid-1980s, there were no major 
differences in output between the two sectors. It is only since 1988, as a result of 
structural adjustment, that modern or commercial agriculture has become more 
dynamic and come to differ significantly from the agricultural production of the 
peasants. The proportion of peasant agriculture in the agricultural GDP declined 
from 85 per cent from 1980-84 to 74 per cent from 1990-94, while 
entrepreneurial agriculture increased from 14 per cent from 1980-84 to 25 per 
cent during the period 1990-94 (a rise of 78 per cent).17 
We can, then, say that the free market policy effectively removed the peasant 
economy from a national market where peasants had participated since the 1953 
Land Reform and forced them into subsistence. Only a very few could survive 
within niches of export crop circuits, since imported foodstuffs are protected by 
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series of subsidies in their original countries and national entrepreneurial 
agriculture obtained important subsidies from the Paz Estenssoro government. It 
has to be emphasised that the success of the 1985 stabilisation programme has 
been achieved at the cost of a decade and a half of continuous contracting of the 
peasant and indigenous economy. 
Land tax 
In 1986, as a part of the fiscal reform, a general land tax was re-established. Land 
taxes had been levied on the peasantry and indigenous population in one form or 
another since the foundation of the republic, but had been abolished as part of the 
Agrarian Reform in 1953. As a result of marches and mobilisations protesting against 
the re-imposition of these taxes in 1985, they were once again abolished in 1986. The 
argument for abolition was that peasant incomes were lower than those of urban wage 
earners, who were already exempt from income tax, but the cost of collecting the land 
tax was greater than its total revenue, strongly suggesting that reasons of efficiency as 
well as those of equity lay behind its withdrawal. 
The land tax revenue from entrepreneurial organisations for the whole country 
only averaged US$300,000 a year during the decade 1986-96 — some ten per cent 
of the target to be collected.18 Ten years after the land tax was implemented, the 
1996 INRA Act reintroduced exemption for peasants and indigenous peoples. In 
the case of entrepreneurial organisations, the new act introduced the concept of land 
price self-valuation and the payment of a land tax according to a scheduled figure in 
order to discourage land speculation. It is still too early to evaluate whether this 
fiscal mechanism has promoted the productive use of land and discouraged 
speculation. Nevertheless, following the experience of several Latin American 
countries, a land tax imposed on the large landowners has not been collected at 
anything like assessed rates and often is simply not paid at all.19 
In a 1999 report the World Bank recognised that the current general tax 
system in Bolivia is distinctly regressive with respect to equity. The system is 
weakened by special regimes such as the Regimen Agrario Unificado (RAU), 
which results in low tax collection and inequity by virtue of large taxpayers 
hiding behind these regimes. The use of the Fixed Property Tax (Impuesto a la 
Propiedad de los Bienes Inmuebles — IPBI), which includes rural property, 
instead of the RAU, is in urgent need of revision, while the RAU itself suffers 
from the fact that presumed income is based on an outdated land valuation. 
Although the RAU regime was created in 1996, no collection has been yet 
registered. The current participation of the agricultural sector in the general tax 
collection effort is only 0.4 per cent of the total.20 
Fiscal incentives for the modern sector 
During the first years of the SAP after 1985, important fiscal incentives to promote 
the non-traditional agricultural exports were established. These mainly consisted of 
reducing taxes on sector exports, trade agreements with several countries and the 
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reduction of taxes on imports to five per cent on capital goods and ten per cent on 
other goods. At the same time, the freight rates of public railroads transporting 
agricultural exports and the price of petrol for tractors and machinery were reduced. 
This has been the context for the acceleration in the growth of agricultural 
commodities in Santa Cruz during the past decade. At the same time, a comprehensive 
programme of rural infrastructure in the lowlands financed by the World Bank was 
improved and focused on the promotion of soya cultivation as part of a policy to shift 
the structure of agricultural production towards external markets. The impoverishment 
of peasants was not simply an undesirable side effect of structural adjustment, but a 
positive political choice in the use of national external debt and public investment 
oriented to entrepreneurial agriculture. 
From the Social Emergency Fund (FSE) to the Social Investment Fund (FIS) 
Alongside the implementation of public policies designed to tackle hyperinflation 
in 1985, a good part of the public financial resources provided by international 
donors — which at that time were dispersed among several ministries — were 
brought together in one central institution directly dependent on the presidency 
of the republic. In 1986 the Social Emergency Fund (FSE) was established with 
the aim of diminishing the negative effects of unemployment in the public sector 
and the increased poverty brought about by the crisis, drought and SAP. 
The FSE was administered outside the traditional state bureaucracy and provided 
experience of demand-driven projects that was frequently used in popular 
participation. Neighbourhood committees, rural communities, churches and other 
social groups were consulted. The FSE was initially conceived as a transitory 
programme, but its success — particularly in terms of its budget implementation — 
and the persistence of poverty and underemployment encouraged and required a 
second stage: its conversion into the Social Investment Fund (FIS), which was 
oriented more towards productive infrastructure than services, and with a major 
allocation of financial resources to rural areas. 
Having been brought within the framework of popular participation, since 1994 all 
the projects that the FTS finances have to be approved by the municipal councils. In all 
cases the municipality has to contribute with a percentage of its own resources. 
Nevertheless, the great majority of the financial resources that the FIS administrates 
derive from international donors, which made this institution unsustainable because is 
not financed with national resources.21 The same problem has occurred with the Fondo 
de Desarrollo Campesino (FDC), the Fondo del Medio Ambiente (FONAMA) and 
other social funds (SFs). In their present form SFs address neither structural poverty 
nor its causes and their results are questionable in terms of contributing to substantial 
changes in people's lives. 
The Fondo de Desarrollo Campesino 
The state-owned Agricultural Bank was closed in 1985 as part of the NEP. The 
Bank had been the main source of public funds for all agricultural producers. The 
Fondo de Desarrollo Campesino (FDC) was promoted by external donors and 
was set up in 1989 within the Ministry of Peasant Affairs and Agriculture 
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(MACA). However, this key institution has never become a principal source of 
financing for rural development, as it was supposed to. The FDC is responsible 
for non-refundable projects oriented towards rural infrastructure such as local 
roads, small bridges and irrigation systems. Secondly, it oversees credit projects 
for community and cooperative groups. This line of credit was commonly used 
for political ends and was beset by corruption. International donors made the 
continuation of funds conditional upon better supervision of the borrowing 
process.22 The Popular Participation Act of 1994 established that all community 
projects had to be presented to the FDC board of directors through the 
municipalities following participatory planning. Between 1993 and 1997 the 
FDC financed some 1,000 small projects with US$24 million in productive non-
refundable projects and some US$4 million in credits through specialised 
institutions to the benefit of 265,000 rural families.23 
In spite of the particular efforts made by some managers, the misconduct of others 
(1989-93) has damaged the image of this institution and lost it important credibility 
and resources. The peasants' demand for credit in order to promote rural development 
is still far from satisfied. Other private institutions specialised in micro-credit — 
mainly NGOs — are working successfully, but only on a very small scale. 
One fundamental problem of the FDC is the bureaucratic and traditional 
approach to credit programmes for rural development imposed by the banking 
superintendency. As a result of this poor small borrowers have to present their 
land titles as collateral for the grants, but they rarely possess such titles, which 
cannot be mortgaged according to the Constitution and the INRA Act. A much 
broader and more flexible system is required, recognising that micro-credit has to 
allow personal and cross guarantee. Equally, the rate of interest ought not to be 
higher than that of the commercial system. 
Decentralisation, popular participation and participatory planning 
During the last two decades of democratic process a number of ideas regarding rural 
development have been debated and tested. With the Administrative Decentralisation 
and the Popular Participation Acts of 1994, strong popular demands were confronted. 
On the one hand, turbulent regional civic committees were claiming that the regional 
structures of local power should receive full control of public funds, hitherto 
administered at the departmental level by the Corporaciones Regionales de 
Desarrollo. On the other hand, socially mobilised peasants and indigenous peoples 
demanded complete political and administrative local autonomy. 
Responding to documents and resolutions from indigenous meetings, as well as to 
the proposals of some NGOs, the Sanchez de Lozada-Cardenas administration 
displayed creativity and a willingness to imagine a different country. The 
government's basic proposal was to encourage local power through the immediate 
recognition of legal substance to thousands of small rural communities and their 
ancestral authorities, the allocation of 20 per cent of tax revenue according to the 
number of inhabitants and the creation of 311 new municipalities with special 
surveillance committees. This act was the most important effort to redistribute 
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national funds from the public budget to the rural areas since the foundation of 
the republic in 1825. These funds can be augmented with resources from other 
bodies and programmes, such as the FIS, FDC and FONAMA. 
In 1994 the municipalities had a budget of approximately US$80 million. As 
a result of decentralisation, some US$240 million of national funds were 
programmed for the year 1999.24 Of the 311 municipalities, 280 are rural, while 
40 per cent of the Bolivian population lives in the countryside and subsists 
principally on agricultural activities. 
The Sanchez de Lozada government (1993-97) perceived the municipalisation 
of the country as a central part of the process of administrative decentralisation, 
assigning additional regional responsibilities to each department and to their 
authorities. Competition between local and regional government began. The 
participation and local planning that went into the allocation of public resources 
was an important tool in each of the municipalities, and thousands of small projects 
emerged at grassroots level. An extensive social network has developed to 
encourage citizens in the exercise of local government and the prioritisation of 
investment to promote rural development. 
Between 1995 and 1997, rural municipalities developed more than 10,000 
project-proposals with a budget estimated at $655 million. This process included 
1,500 planning meetings in which some 56,000 local indigenous leaders and 
community representatives participated.25 The main problem was that most of these 
project-proposals were not connected to regional or national frameworks and only a 
minority of them achieved the status of final project. From those selected, just a few 
were approved by the municipal council and eventually financed. There has been a 
participatory process of learning about how to prioritise local needs and forge links 
with regional programmes. However, the existence of hundreds of operational 
municipal programmes does not of itself constitute a rural strategy at either 
departmental or national level.26 
The Popular Participation Act represents an attempt to correct an enormous 
historical bias by providing fiscal equilibrium in the assignment of municipal public 
funds according to the number of inhabitants. At the same time, it has given 
important political power to the peasant and indigenous communities, although 
political parties still have excessive control and a strong urban bias continues to 
exist. The constitutional obligation for candidates for mayor or counsellor to be 
supported by a political party is a major barrier that militates against local power, 
because many candidates are still imposed by urban-oriented political parties and 
local government loses legitimacy and power. 
The systematic rejection of local power structures by the urban, centralised 
political parties was, until 1994, the principal reason for the chronic downward spiral 
of rural poverty. These reforms have introduced a new social, political and economic 
instrument with real potential to break the circuit of poverty, but only so long as the 
new rules are maintained and strengthened. The recognition of ancestral forms of 
social organisation, the promotion of administrative capacity, a democratic renovation 
of the leadership, the recognition of forms of local power in the context of the 
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administrative decentralisation of the country, together with participatory planning, all 
militate for innovative rural development. 
Nevertheless, this process of growing local citizenship depends vitally upon 
access to more productive land, improvements in irrigation infrastructure and 
permanent access to water, rural roads, electricity, access to credit and new 
technology, together with better public services in education and health. 
Moreover, even if the process of growing citizenship were taking place and all 
the policies described here were efficiently applied, rural development would be 
impossible to achieve if some macroeconomic policies are maintained as they 
are. The macroeconomic policies of the SAP are not neutral, especially the 
indiscriminate free import of foodstuffs from abroad. To reverse the extremely 
difficult situation in rural Bolivia, it is necessary to promote differentiated rural 
public policies not only at a social level but particularly at the macroeconomic 
level. Such policies include greater fiscal transfers, public expenditure on 
infrastructure, progressive taxation of large landowners, promotion of rural 
microenterprises, reduced transport costs, technical assistance and marketing.27 
Educational Reform 
The Educational Reform was one of the most urgent reforms of recent years, 
and possibly the only one with very high support and consensus within 
Bolivian society, with the notable exception of the teachers themselves. Two 
consecutive governments have failed to improve this process. The 
Educational Reform Bill was passed in July 1994, but it has yet to be 
extensively applied and teachers' direct participation has been either low or 
disruptive. Teachers oppose the reform because they will lose their 
corporate control of education as well as their union privileges. Their unions 
are absolutely opposed to what they see as the privatisation of education. 
Between 1994 and 1997 a budget of US$35 million was spent on educational 
reform, the main finance coming in the form of Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) and World Bank credits. Education in rural schools remains particularly poor. One 
of the reform's main purposes, bilingual and intercultural education, sometimes 
encounters unexpected enemies. For example, the relatives of the students of indigenous 
origin are often not interested that their children learn their original language because 
they need to learn Spanish in order to be recognised as equal citizens. At the same time, 
not all rural teachers manage the native languages well or confidently. The ethnic and 
cultural diversity of Bolivian society is still highly significant. The persistent lack of 
adequate education, adapted in its content to the rural environment and its diversity, is 
one of the main obstacles to rural development. The situation will be worse still if 
educational reform remains disconnected from other recent reforms. 
Agricultural and other technical skills are insufficiently represented in the 
new curriculum. Bolivian education is still urban and westernised. Education is 
seen by many peasants as the means by which their children can escape from 
rural poverty by going to the cities. The fragmented way in which educational 
reform has been designed means that it does not take into account the role of the 
new municipalities, the need for technical institutes for rural development or the 
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development of new productive capacities for modern agriculture. The exclusive 
focus on cultural and linguistic topics has diminished its potential. 
Agricultural research and the extension of new technology 
Agricultural research and technical education has not existed in practice for the 
last six years. The institution formerly in charge of this area, the Instituto 
Boliviano de Tecnologia Agropecuaria (IBTA), is still in the process of 
dissolution and no alternative has yet been established. Since 1993 a project 
supposedly converting the IBTA into a private institution, which would manage 
local and concessional funds, has been under permanent discussion. Of all the 
countries of the region, Bolivia is the one that allocates least financial and human 
resources to agricultural research and extension.28 This is certainly one of the 
principal explanations for the very low levels of agricultural yields and 
productivity, probably the lowest in Latin America. The only exception to this 
sorry picture is the Centro de Investigation Agricola Tropical (CIAT), which has 
achieved high levels of efficiency in the lowlands of Santa Cruz, with mixed 
public-private participation and the support of British aid. One key technological 
problem in Bolivian agriculture is that the traditional technologies of indigenous 
society have not been integrated with modern science. On one hand, modern 
technology packages generally do not recognise the existence of efficient ancient 
forms of cultivation and processing, on the other, modem technology is 
expensive and frequently not appropriate for the Bolivian environment. It is 
urgently necessary to define the role and function of a new public institution, 
with social participation, as in CIAT Santa Cruz. 
Alternative development 
Policies for the substitution of coca leaf production, mainly promoted by the US 
government and UNDP, generally come under the heading of alternative 
development, especially in the tropical area of Cochabamba. While coca leaf 
cultivation is an obstacle to rural development, the alternative programme is itself a 
major distraction in the allocation of investment funds and resources to rural 
development. Over the past decade, alternative agricultural development has 
concentrated approximately US$200 million in an ecologically fragile area, where soils 
are of a rainforest character and not suitable for agricultural purposes. This allocation of 
funds is, furthermore, not in line with national rural development plans, being 
concentrated in a geographical region that is not in the extreme poverty category 
compared to the rest of the Bolivian campesinado. 
The institutions in charge of alternative development (mostly USAID) manage 
greater funds than those aimed at rural development in areas with high levels of 
poverty and peasant emigration. Paradoxically, the payment of US$2,500 to each 
producer per hectare of coca leaf eradicated, plus the public investments in roads, 
bridges and electric power, constituted encouragement to continue cropping coca and 
themselves promoted Andean peasant emigration to the tropics as well as reducing 
funds for rural development in other areas. The Banzer administration (1997-) has 
suspended the private monetary compensation to each coca producer. Now a 
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communal investment has to be provided by central government in exchange for the 
eliminated coca. 
Environmental policies 
Over recent years the state has promoted several environmental policies, such as 
protected areas, territorial ordering and plans for the use of the soil. These bills 
have encountered difficulties because consultation over the social and economic 
aspects has been weak. In many cases new laws have increased the production 
costs for farmers, cattle breeders and timber factories. In Bolivia, as in many 
countries of the Latin American region, there is only the slightest public concern 
about environmental issues and the Ministry of Sustainable Development and 
Environment, created in 1993, has not succeeded in decentralising its functions 
to the departmental prefectures. Municipalities have neither the institutional 
capacity nor the legal framework for assuming such responsibilities. 
Natural resources policies 
More than 45 years after the first reform took place, the issue of peasant and 
indigenous access to, and ownership of, land remains unsolved. That is why in 
1984 the CSUTCB presented a new bill — the Ley Agraria Fundamental (LAF) 
— which demanded an entirely new reform enshrining the principle of 'the land 
to the tiller' but with the critical caveat 'who works it in person'. This proposal 
opened a new period of debate and comprehensive peasant and indigenous 
mobilisations over access to, use and tenancy of the land. These demands were 
only partially fulfilled when the INRA Act was passed in 1996. 
At the same time as peasants and indigenous promoted their claims, the large 
landowners presented another bill promoting a free market and absolute property 
rights to the land, under the aegis of SA. They demanded changes to the 
constitution and, thus, the elimination of the formalised socioeconomic function 
of the land. Yet, the INRA Act of 1996 differs from other Latin American land 
acts because it does not have a 'free land market' at its core.29 Instead, it seeks to 
regulate a segmented land market.30 That is probably the reason the World Bank 
does not include the INRA Act among the structural adjustment policies analysed 
in the last public expenditure review.31 
The INRA Act revoked the absolute public power of the old Consejo 
Nacional de Reforma Agraria, which was corrupt and operated in an arbitrary 
manner. The INRA Act maintains the principle of the social function of 
communal lands, indigenous peoples and smallholders, whose lands cannot be 
reverted or expropriated. On the other hand, the Act establishes that the state can 
revert or expropriate the lands of the large landholders only in cases in which 
entrepreneurial units do not effectively recognise the socioeconomic function of 
the land, i.e. when it remains idle. The use of land has to be proved by the 
payment of land tax. The state cannot donate free land to the large landholders, 
but only to the communities and indigenous peoples who wish to own the land 
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exclusively in a communal way. The INRA Act is remarkable because it is the 
first time in Bolivian history that indigenous people are being given the titles to 
large territories, under the concept of Original Communal Lands, established 
within the framework of the reformed constitution. In 1997 the titles to some 
three million hectares were granted and another 11 million hectares of idle land 
were reserved for indigenous people of the lowlands. Unfortunately, the act does 
not endow municipalities with the authority to manage lands, but only to collect 
land taxes from the entrepreneurial properties. Within the framework of the act, a 
formally comprehensive process of entitlement has been taking place. To secure 
property rights for all the owners, a legal review has to determine which land 
distributed by the Land Reform of 1953 has to be secured. The aim of the law is to 
recover uncultivated lands in the hands of speculators from the lowlands. In reality, 
however, due to the lack of political will on the part of the Banzer administration, the 
INRA Act is being used as an instrument to consolidate latifundios. Not one hectare of 
land has been reverted from speculators since the approval of the act in 1996, nor has 
one hectare of land been given to the landless. 
Three years after the approval of the INRA Act, the core of the new system of 
agricultural justice, the Agricultural Court created by law had not yet been 
nominated. The new legislation encountered strong resistance from some groups 
of large landowners in the department of Santa Cruz who refused to pay land 
taxes according to their own valuation of the land. In April 1999 they obtained a 
moratorium for the payment of the land taxes until 2001. Receipts from this tax 
were already down at the beginning of the current government and the 1999 
World Bank Report states that the agricultural tax regime (RAU) is problematic 
because it is based on outdated property values. The cadastral register needs to 
be updated and the RAU combined with the existing property tax (IPBI — 
Impuesto a la Propiedad de los Bienes Inmuebles).32 
The Rain Forest Law, also approved in 1996 after a long process of consultation, has 
had important effects, recovering as state property more than 20 million hectares of rain 
forest, which were under the temporary concessional regime in the hands of timber 
enterprises. The Forestry Superintendency has demonstrated that there are at least some 
public institutions that are efficient, honest and transparent, gaining recognition from 
indigenous, entrepreneurial and international agency sectors. One important outcome of 
this law is the administrative decentralisation of forestry resources through territorial 
ordering plans within each municipality with the objective of putting a brake on the 
accelerated erosion of the forest which has taken place during the last three decades.33 
The classification of the lands according to capacity of use allows the basic ordering of 
the territory that is needed under any strategy of rural development. 
Gender and rural development 
Indigenous customary rights mixed with Creole machista attitudes have reinforced 
social rules excluding women. Indeed, when studying poverty indicators, it is clear 
that women, and especially rural women, are poorer and less educated and have the 
highest mortality rate. At the same time, their contribution to familial income is 
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generally greater than that of the men. When the father emigrates in search of seasonal 
work, the wife characteristically remains in charge of the family, cattle and the land. 
Women, though, are rarely permitted to participate in political activities; when there is 
a communal meeting, women generally have to sit at the back of the room on the 
floor. They have the right to listen but not to speak in public. Despite extensive new 
regulations included in the current democratic process of reform, social practice is still 
a long way from the theory. 
Article 3 of the INRA Act determines equal property rights of land ownership for 
women and men, regardless of their civil condition. The regulation of this article is 
also clear, but in reality there are no women who own land except for widows. The 
Popular Participation Act does not include positive discrimination in favour of female 
participation in the Surveillance Committees, on which few women sit. In June 1999, 
on the other hand, the Political Parties Act included a quota of at least 30 per cent of 
women's participation in all political representation at local or national level. 
Ethnic and cultural policies 
The reform of the constitution initiated during the Paz Zamora administration 
(1989-93) concluded with the incorporation of an article that defines Boliva as a 
multi-ethnic and pluri-lingual country. This modification prepared the ground for 
further series of initiatives from the curricula of the Educational Reform passing 
through the administration of the ayllus and the TCOs and inter-municipal 
indigenous networks, which have raised social expectations. 
Yet the reform of the judiciary did not include the ethnic perspective that had been 
conceived in some of the bills. With the exception of the ombudsman, no part of the 
reformed judiciary system has a specifically rural presence or mandate and it remains 
inaccessible to the peasants and indigenous people, not only because of the difficulty 
in travelling to the cities from the countryside, but also because of Spanish 
monolingual procedure and lack of interpreters (68 per cent of the provincial judiciary 
courts and 49 per cent of local judiciary tribunals are located in urban areas). The 
judicial system remains bureaucratic and slow, the majority of the cases prey to 
corruption. Thus, the majority of indigenous people and peasants resolve their legal 
problems in an informal way according to their customary law.34 
The Strategy for Agricultural Productive Transformation (ETPA) 
Towards the end of the Sanchez de Lozada-Cardenas administration (1993-97) 
international aid agencies such as the IDB and the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO), together with local officials, promoted a public 
initiative for a long-term strategy of rural development as a precondition for the 
continued support of rural development programmes. The consulting group that 
met in Paris in 1996 discussed the Programa de Inversion Publica para la 
Estrategia de Transformation Productiva del Agro (ETPA), the main aim of 
which was to provide a long-term approach, inspired by the participatory process 
that was taking place in Bolivia at that time. 
The ETPA programme, which was the first long-term strategy for rural 
development in Bolivia to be agreed with international donors, had a budget of 
34 Van Cott (1998). 
US$2,300 million for the years 1996-2000, of which US$54 million was the 
share of the central government, while US$1,000 million were the funds of the 
rural municipalities and US$1,264 million the support of the international 
donors. In accordance with the budget of the Sanchez de Lozada ETPA, the 
Banzer Government was supposed to invest some US$250 million during 1998, 
but in the event the sum allocated was only US$17 million.35 
Rural poverty remains widespread 
After almost two decades of tentative and weak public policies and private 
initiatives for rural development, rural poverty has not decreased to any 
significant degree, even though financial stability and sustained economic 
development have been achieved at a national level. This is mainly due to poor 
human resource endowments and a lack of productive infrastructure.36 
According to several studies,37 poverty in rural areas has increased in some 
cases and in others remains constant. According to Vos et al., SAP has led to a 
widening rather than a narrowing of income disparities between urban and rural 
areas. The 1998 Human Development Report38 demonstrates that a positive 
evolution in human development indicators at the national level in Bolivia has 
taken place over the past 30 years. However, when taking into account urban-rural 
differences, as well as differences among regions, it becomes evident that this 
development has been highly uneven and that these differences remain constant or 
are increasing. This is also true for differences between women and men as well as 
indigenous and non-indigenous people. Poverty is more widespread in non-Spanish 
speaking monolingual rural areas and among women both in the cities and the 
countryside. The rural poverty map shows alarming indicators not only because the 
levels of life expectancy, nutrition, literacy and other main social indicators are still 
extremely low, but also because these indicators are persistently low over long 
periods of time. For example, piped water supply coverage in urban areas is 93 per 
cent compared with 37 per cent in rural areas.39 
Of the rural population of some 3.5 million people, 70 per cent live in extreme 
poverty, nearly 20 per cent are moderately poor and only ten per cent are not poor.40 
This distribution of poverty is the direct result of unequal access to, and distribution 
of, natural resources, the distance to the consumption centres and service markets, lack 
of connection with trade lines, the impossibility of creating added value to the basic 
products, reduced access to information and technology and a lack of permanent 
electric power. According to the 1998 National Demographic and Health Survey, the 
percentage of children under three that are considered chronically malnourished is 
24.2 per cent — down slightly from the 1994 figure of 28.3 per cent. The same 1998 
survey conducted blood tests and found a prevalence of anaemia in children that was 
extremely high at 67 per cent.41 
35 Crespo (1998). 
36 Vos, Lee and Mejia in Thiesenhusen (1998). 
37 UNDP (1998), National Census (1992), UDAPSO (1995). 
38 UNDP (1998). 
39 World Bank (1999). 
40 UNDP (1998). 
41 World Bank (1999). 
Conclusions and policy recommendations 
1. It is necessary to guarantee the continuity of major public policies. 
Nevertheless, some of the features of the SAP that have been considered 
sacrosanct since their approval in 1985 should be reviewed, in particular the 
liberalisation of food imports, the low rate of exchange of the Bolivian currency, 
the high rate of interest of the national financial system and the lack of credit to 
the rural areas. These do not help to generate a safe national food system and 
promote the polarisation of Bolivian society and extreme rural poverty. 
2. The current productive structure and investment programmes, which reflect 
land tenure in Bolivia, are not compatible with rural development. The inclusion 
of the peasants in the process of modernisation of the agricultural sector must be 
an integral part of any rural development programme. As Chiriboga points out, 
while peasants and indigenous people continue to be marginalised as potential 
productive fanners, the process of rural impoverishment will continue 
inexorably.42 Structural adjustment policies do not consider peasants to be part of 
the productive sector. They are considered and treated only as a burden to the 
rest of society, which has to provide humanitarian aid programmes. All rural 
development programmes in Bolivia are totally financed by external aid with the 
remarkable exception of Popular Participation, which assigns 20 per cent of 
income taxes to all municipalities regardless of their urban or rural condition. In 
fact, a Bolivian public budget specifically for rural development, financed with 
its own local sources, simply does not exist. This must change. Bolivian society 
has to invest in rural development. 
3. The current leadership and institutional framework of rural organisations, 
especially those of peasants and colonisers, has to be improved through 
democratic process. A better organisation and representation of agricultural 
producers is essential to ensure the capacity for negotiating and lobbying, with 
both the state and international donors. 
4. Since 1985, the benefits of the modern sector of the agricultural economy have 
not been extended to the peasant and indigenous sector. The problem is that the 
peasant economy has fallen back on traditional crops, internal consumption and 
local markets. The peasant population does not have the capacity to compete, by 
itself, in a national market and still less in an open international market. Local 
markets have to be encouraged and protected. 
5. Some specific crops and commodities produced by small farmers have found 
temporary niches in international markets, but this strategy is not sustainable without 
differentiated public policies. Peasant-oriented public policies could, for example, 
encourage the exports of coffee, cocoa and citrus fruits. Taxes on imports of 
machinery and equipment for agricultural production, including the peasant small 
producers, could be eliminated for a short-term period. Significant public investment 
in roads should be undertaken beyond the interests of the modem sector. Investment in 
rural roads could be re-addressed towards regions of high demographic density. 
6. The ETPA was expected to achieve a technological leap, to increase investment in 
rural education and public health, modernising land administration and other natural 
resources and prioritising investments in roads and irrigation to expand internal 
42 Chiriboga (1992). 
markets, decrease risks and increase yields. Further policies should give real 
continuity to the latter. Because each government in Bolivia wants to be different from 
the previous one, rural development policies lack the required continuity. In spite of 
the Sanchez de Lozada ETPA and the four pillars of Banzer's administration, there is 
still no long-term national strategy for rural development in Bolivia. 
7. NGOs are largely absent from areas of extreme rural poverty. Due to their 
assistance during the past two decades, some peasants and indigenous peoples do now 
have access to credit, technology and productive organisation, consolidating niches in 
local markets. They have escaped extreme poverty because they have achieved some 
surplus, but they cannot accumulate, invest or improve their basis of production. Most 
of these peasants are permanently linked to urban markets. The next stage for NGOs is 
to work with the poorest and weakest rural communities that are far from the cities. 
NGOs have to transfer their activities to the poorest municipalities of the countryside 
and co-ordinate their services according to the demand of the municipal Planes 
Operativos Anuales (POAs). 
8. An institutionalised culture of conflict prevention does not exist in Bolivia. 
Nor does a permanent stage on which to promote concerted public policies. As 
we have seen in this paper, during the last two decades of stable democracy, but 
particularly since 1993, civil society and government have promoted several 
public policies with generally positive effects. But the poorest rural 
municipalities, in spite of enormous potential and the correct use of their co-
participacion tributaria, are not able to achieve real and sustainable 
development by themselves. A broader participatory process for rural 
development could be agreed only within the framework of a national pact, 
which affords equal representation for urban and rural communities. 
9. In spite of the current dispositions of the INRA and Tributary Acts, land tax is 
not being collected from large landowners. As a result, there is no stimulus for 
using the land in a productive way. In fact, the INRA Act is being used as a tool 
for the protection of latifundia. There is an urgent need to apply the INRA Act 
and change the current system of land ownership still present in the rural 
Bolivian economy, that is, to stop speculation in land, especially in the lowlands. 
It is important that current land ownership and cadastral programmes continue to 
strengthen security of all land property rights. 
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